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Abstract
A mobile ad hoc network MANET is a self-organized wireless network where
mobile nodes can communicate with each other without the use of any existing
network infrastructure or centralized administration. Trust establishment and man-
agement are essential for any security framework of MANETs. However, tradi-
tional solutions to key management through accessing trusted authorities or cen-
tralized servers are infeasible for MANETs due to the absence of infrastructure,
frequent mobility, and wireless link instability. In this paper we propose a robust
self-organized, public key management for MANETs. The proposed scheme re-
lies on establishing a small number of trust relations between neighboring nodes
during the network initialization phase. Experiences gained as a result of success-
ful communications and node mobility through the network enhance the formation
of a web of trust between mobile nodes. The proposed scheme allows each user
to create its public key and the corresponding private key, to issue certificates to
neighboring nodes, and to perform public key authentication through at least two
independent certificate chains without relying on any centralized authority. A mea-
sure of the communications cost of the key distribution process has been proposed.
Simulation results show that the proposed scheme is robust and efficient in the mo-
bility environment of MANET and against malicious node attacks.
keywords: Key Management, Mobile Ad Hoc Network
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network MANET is a self-organized wireless network where mobile
nodes can communicate with each other without reliance on a centralized authority.
Each node is able to communicate with other nodes within its transmission range and
relies on other nodes to communicate with nodes outside its transmission range. In
cellular networks, communications between two mobile nodes completely rely on the
wired backbone and the fixed base stations. In a MANET, no such infrastructure exists
and the network topology may dynamically change in an unpredictable manner since
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nodes are free to move [1]. The absence of centralized administration and the infras-
tructureless nature make MANETs good for emergency, military and fast deployment
communications.
The security of most conventional networks relies on the existence of a specialized
network administration that defines the security policy and provides the infrastructure
for implementing it. The lack of any centralized network management or certification
authority makes MANET very vulnerable to infiltration, eavesdropping, interference,
and so on. Security in MANET is an essential component to supply the network with
the basic functions such as routing and packet forwarding. If a priori trust relations
exist between the nodes of an ad hoc network, entity authentication can be sufficient
to assure the correct execution of critical network functions. A priori trust can only
exist in a few special scenarios like military networks and corporate networks, where
a common, trusted authority manages the network [1]. With the lack of a priori trust,
classical network security mechanisms can not be used in MANETs. The trust rela-
tionships established between network nodes could be used for the provision of higher
level security solutions, such as key management. Key management is a basic part of
any secure communication. Secure network communications normally involve a key
distribution procedure between communication parties, in which the key may be trans-
mitted through insecure channels. A framework of trust relationships needs to be built
for authentication of key ownership in the key distribution procedure.
In MANET, key management can be classified into two kinds; the first one is based
on a centralized or distributed trusted third party (TTP). The TTP is responsible for
issuing, revoking, renewing, and providing keying material to nodes participating in
the network such as [2], [3], and [4] where the key management process is performed
using threshold cryptography [5]. In the (n, t) threshold cryptography, a secret key
is divided into n shares according to a random polynomial and kept by n legitimate
nodes, which we call share holders. Later, a new node needs to collect t shares from
the response of t nodes (among n nodes) based on Lagrange interpolation and generates
the original secret key as a legitimate node.
The second kind of key management is the self-organized key management schemes,
such as [6], and [7]. Self-organized schemes allow nodes to generate their own key-
ing material, issue public-key certificates to other nodes in the network based on their
knowledge. Certificates are stored and distributed by the nodes. Each node maintains a
local certificate repository that contains a limited number of certificates selected by the
node according to an appropriate algorithm. Public-key authentication is performed
via chains of certificates.
In this paper, we propose a robust self-organized public key management for MANETs.
The proposed scheme is based on the existence of a web of trust between mobile nodes
forming the network. Since the use of random graph theory in MANET is limited to
quasi-static networks due to constraints and nodes mobility [8], random graph theory
is used in the proposed scheme to represent the public keys and certificates of the sys-
tem in the initialization phase only. The proposed scheme allows each user to create its
public key and the corresponding private key, to issue certificates to neighboring nodes,
and to perform public key authentication without relying on any centralized authority.
Each node in the network has a trust table to store the public key certificates and the
corresponding trust values. A trust value represents a node’s belief that another node
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is trustworthy. The certificate chain discovery will be performed with the aid of the
routing process. A measure of the communication cost is proposed. A comprehensive
analysis of the proposed scheme in the mobility environment of MANETs will be per-
formed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work.
Section 3 provides the system description and trust model of our proposed scheme. The
simulation environment and performance metrics are described in Section 4 and then
the results are presented in Section 5. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
In this section a review of key management schemes for MANETs will be presented. In
[2], and [9], threshold cryptography has been proposed to provide a reliable, distribu-
tive key management for MANET by exploiting some nodes as trust anchors for the rest
of the network. In these schemes, threshold cryptography involves additional computa-
tionally intensive modular exponentiation compared to the underlined asymmetric-key
cryptographic protocols. Most low-powered wireless nodes do not have the resources
to handle such computationally intensive operations. Capkun et al. in [4] proposed a
self-organized public key management scheme in which each node issues certificates
independently and manages them at its repository. In this scheme, certificates are stored
and distributed by the nodes and each node maintains a local certificate repository that
contains a limited number of certificates selected by the node according to an appro-
priate algorithm. Key authentication is performed via chains of certificates. However,
this scheme suffers from the delay and the large amount of traffic required to collect
certificates. Kitada et al. in [10], and [11] considered the problem of certificate chain
discovery by introducing the Ad hoc Simultaneous Nodes Search protocol (ASNS) to
find a certificate chain. In the proposed scheme by Kitada et al., each node holds in its
local repository only certificates issued to it in order to reduce the memory size and col-
lects certificates by broadcasting search packets to chained nodes. The scheme suffers
from high communication cost because of broadcasting packets with certificates. Li et
al in [12] proposed a public key management scheme performed by generating a pub-
lic/private key pair by the node itself, issuing certificates to neighboring nodes, holding
these certificates in its certificate repository. This scheme considers only the updated
certificate repository to reduce the number of certificates stored in its certificate reposi-
tory. Ren et al. in [13] proposed a distributed trust model based on introducing a secret
dealer to accomplish trust initialization in the system bootstrapping phase to overcome
the problem of delayed trust establishment as in [4]. In this scheme a secret dealer pro-
vides each node with a secret short list includes a number of entries, and the number
of entries is determined according to the group size n and may vary slightly from node
to node. Each entry contains a binding of node identifier and its corresponding public
key: (ID, Pk). After receiving the short list, the following conditions should be met:
• Every node in the network receives a secret short list SL, which contains n semi-
randomly selected (ID,PK) pairs;
• The (ID,PK) pairs are distributed symmetrically. If node i gets the (ID,PK) pair
of node j, then the (ID,PK) pair of node i is also included in the secret short list
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SL of node j’s, that is, (IDi,PKi)⊂ SL j, if (ID j,PK j) ⊂ SLi, where SLi is the
short list obtained by node i.
After that, each node starts to issue certificates for the received bindings and store them
locally. The existence of the secret dealer makes the scheme prone to the centralized
administration problems. For example, it has a single point of attack because if the
secret dealer is compromised during the bootstrapping phase, the security of the whole
system will be at risk. The performance of the scheme in the mobility environment of
MANETs is low as will be shown in section 5 because the certificate graph, which is
used to model this web of trust relationship, may not be strongly connected.
3 System Description And Trust Model
In this section we present an overview of the trust model and the system description of
our proposed scheme.
3.1 Trust Model
3.1.1 Certificate Chain
The trust model of our proposed scheme is based on the existence of public-key cer-
tificates as bindings of the public keys and the corresponding user identities IDs. The
certificate should also contain the node’s identity/network address, sequence number,
trust value, certificate generation and validity dates.
We denote CertA→B as the certificate signed by node A’s private key SKA to repre-
sent its assurance in the binding of node B and its public key PKB. For simplicity we
denote Sigi as the digital signature of node i. A certificate graph G(V,E), represents
the public keys and certificates of the system in the initialization phase, where V and
E stand for the set of vertices and the set of edges, respectively. The vertices of the
certificate graph represent public keys and the edges represent certificates. A directed
edge from node A to node B will exist if there is a certificate signed with the private
key of node A that binds node B’s identity IDB and its public key PKB. In order for a
node A to authenticate the public-key of another node D as shown in Figure 1, it has
to acquire a chain of valid certificates from node A to node D. The first certificate in
the chain is a certificate issued by node A, so that it will be verified by node A by using
its public key PKA. Each remaining certificate in the chain will be verified using the
public key of the previous certificate in the chain. The last certificate in the chain holds
the public key of the target node D. The certificate chain from node A to node D in
this example is {CertA→B,CertB→C,CertC→D}, and the certificate chain from node D
to node A is {CertD→C,CertC→B,CertB→A}.
It is assumed that there exist sparse trust relationships among the nodes so that any
node that wishes to join the network can establish independent trust relationship with
some of the existing member nodes in the network. For example, a node that wishes
to join the network contacts one of the existing network members through secure side
channels and provides its trust evidence. If the existing network member believes that
the requesting node is trustworthy according to its trust evidence, they can sign and
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exchange certificates. The process is repeated until the joining node gets a sufficient
number of certificates.
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Figure 1: Certificate Chain
3.1.2 Trust Evaluation
We define a trust value as an authentication metric. This trust value represents the
assurance with which a requesting node can obtain the correct public key of a target
node. However, the same assurance in the reverse direction need not exist at the same
time. In other words, the trust relationship is unidirectional. Each node in the network
should have a trust table as shown in table 1 to store the public-key certificates and
the corresponding trust values of the nodes it trusts in the network. There are many
trust metrics have been proposed to evaluate the trust values, some assume discrete
trust values as in PGP [14]. Others assume continuous values for trust [3]. In our trust
model, we define the trust value as a continuous value between 0 and 1. A trust value
Ti, j represents node i’s belief that node j is trustworthy. The higher the value of Ti, j, the
more node i trusts node j, and vice versa. Any node in the network can calculate the
value of trust Ti, j in another node’s public key if there exist a certificate chain between
the two nodes using the following formula:
Ti, j =
k=h
∏
k=1
Tk (1)
where Tk is the value of trust between two directly trusted nodes along the certificate
chain from node i to node j, and h is the number of hops between node i and node j as
shown in Figure 2.
It is obvious from Figure 2 that the value that a node trusts in another node’s public
key fades along the path of recommendation. So, if there is more than one certificate
chain between a pair of nodes, the source node should choose the path with higher trust
value, which is more probably the path with minimum number of hops.
3.1.3 Independent Trusts
The previous work on independent trust evaluation presented in is extended in our pro-
posed scheme. Dependence between certificate chains leads to inaccurate trust values.
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Figure 2: The Trust Model
For example, if a malicious node is a part of dependent certificate chains, the trust com-
putation result will be completely incorrect. In order for a source node to authenticate
the destination node’s public key in the adversary environment of MANET, our pro-
posed key management scheme insists on obtaining the destination node’s public key
through at least two independent certificate chains. In order to introduce the indepen-
dent certificate chains in computing the trust value of the target node, formula 1 will be
modified as follows:
Ti, j =
l=n⋃
l=1
(
k=h
∏
k=1
Tk ) (2)
Where n is the number of independent certificate chains between node i and node
j.
From the inclusion-exclusion principle, the probability of the union of two events
can be computed by taking the sum of their probabilities, and subtracting the probabil-
ities resulting from intersecting as shown in formula
p(A∪B) = p(A)+ p(B)− p(A).p(B) (3)
In our proposed scheme, A and B are the trust values computed from the first and
the second independent certificate chains respectively.
The presence of independent certificate chains in the authentication process results
in an increase in the computed trust value of the target node as shown in the example
in Figure 3.
The values that the source node S trusts in the destination node D from the first
and the second certificate chains are TS,D,1 = 0.504, and TS,D,2 = 0.703 respectively.
According to formulas 2, and 3, the overall trust value will be computed as follows:
TS,D = 0.504+0.403−0.504 ¦ 0.403 = 0.703
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Figure 3: Independent Certificate Chains
It is obvious from the above example that the presence of independent certificate
chains has increased the trust value more than the trust values computed from a single
certificate chain, which is an advantage of our proposed key management scheme.
3.2 System Description
The proposed robust self-organized public key management scheme involves four pro-
cesses as shown in Figure 4: public key and public-key certificate generation, certifi-
cate chain discovery, certificate verification, and certificate revocation. We describe
our proposed scheme in detail according to these four processes.
1. Public Key and Public-Key Certificate Generation
In our proposed scheme, each node generates its public key and the corresponding
private key locally before joining the network by the node itself. Public-key certificates
are issued by the nodes based on node information about other nodes in the network. If
a node u believes that a public key PKi belongs to a certain user i, it has to issue a cer-
tificate to node i signed by its private key PKu representing its assurance of the binding
of the user’s identity IDi and its corresponding public key PKi. Issued certificates to or
from the node should be stored in its trust table with a validity time.
2. Certificate Chain Discovery
In this process, the certificate chain discovery is performed by exploiting the rout-
ing infrastructure. We assume that a certain number of direct trust relations have been
established between each node and its neighbors during the network initialization. Di-
rect trust relations are usually obtained off-line by visual identification, audio exchange
through side channels, and physical contact, but can also be obtained on-line. The num-
ber of directly trusted nodes per node is assumed to be uniformly distributed to enable
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every node in the network to carry out its role in the certificate chain discovery process
with equal probability. We assume that a random graph G(n, p) is a graph of n vertices
and the probability that a connection exists between any two vertices is p. In [15], Er-
dos and Renyi showed that there exists, for monotone properties, a value of p such that
the property transfers from ‘‘nonexistent’’ to ‘‘certainly true’’ in a random graph that
has a very large number of vertices. However, Frank and Martel have shown by sim-
ulation in [16] that these properties are also valid in graphs of moderate size (between
30 to 480 vertices).
Erdos and Renyi showed that if p = ln(n)/n+ c/n , where c is a real constant then
lim
n→∞Pr[G(n, p) connected ] = e
−e−c .
Therefore, given the network size n we can find p and the average degree of a node
(number of trusted neighboring nodes) d = p .(n− 1) for which the resulting graph
is connected with the desired probability Pr[G(n, p) connected ]. Figure 5 illustrates
the plot of the expected degree of a node d as a function of the network size n for
various values of Pr[G(n, p)connected ]. For example if the desired probability to get a
connected graph for 50 nodes network is 0.99, then the average number of neighboring
nodes d should be 6, and for 100 nodes network d should be equal to 10 for the same
probability. The proposed robust self-organized public key management scheme works
in support of an ad hoc on demand routing protocol (such as AODV [17]) after doing
the necessary modifications. The RREQ and the RREP messages format of the AODV
routing protocol have been modified as shown in Figures 6, and 9 respectively in order
to implement the proposed key management scheme. The certificate chain discovery
process can be explained as follows:
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• The source node sends a route request packet to nodes that the source node di-
rectly trusts.
• When a directly trusted node by the source node receives the route request packet
from the source node, it searches for the certificate of the source node signed by
this node in its trust table and adds it to the route request packet before forward-
ing the route request packet to nodes it directly trusts.
• Each node has a trust reply table as shown in table 3.
• When an intermediate node receives the route request packet from a node it
trusts, it sends a route reply to the source node if it has a fresh route to the
destination node.
• If the intermediate node does not have a fresh route to the destination node, it
searches for the certificate of the sender node in its trust table, and adds it to the
route request packet.
• Before forwarding the route request packet to nodes it directly trusts, the inter-
mediate node inserts the ID of the source node, the ID of the destination node,
the RREQ ID, and the ID of the sender node in its trust reply table.
• When the destination node receives a route request packet from a node it directly
trusts, it verifies the certificates included in the route request packet and inserts
the ID of the source node, the RREQ ID, and the ID of the sender node in its
trust reply table.
• The destination node waits until it receives at least another route request, repeats
the previous step and makes sure that the certificate chain included in the second
route request is completely independent from the certificate chain included in the
first received one (i.e. there is no intersecting intermediate node in both routes).
• The destination node sends a route reply to the senders of this route request
according to its trust reply table.
• When an intermediate node receives the route reply, it adds the certificate of the
node it received the route reply from to the route reply and forwards the route
reply to the sender nodes of the corresponding route request according to its trust
reply table.
• The process continues until the route reply reaches the source node.
• When the source node receives the route reply it verifies the certificate chain;
computes the trust value of the chain; inserts the RREQ Id, certificate chain
entities ID’s, and the computed trust value of the chain in the route request table
as shown in table 2.
• The source node waits until it receives a route reply from at least another in-
dependent certificate chain, and according to the chain trust value the source
node chooses a chain to start data transmission to the destination through it. The
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+|                            Originator IP Address                                   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+|                          Originator Sequence Number                         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+|                           Previous Hops Certificates                            |
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|                                                  ….                                           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+|                                                  ….                                           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: RREQ Message Format
source node examines the dependency of the received certificate chain by search-
ing for any intersecting node in the chains stored in its route request table.
Successful communication result in increasing trust between certificate chain enti-
ties and signing more certificates for each others. Node mobility through the network
results in new trust relations and more certificates are added to the node’s trust table.
At the end of the route reply process, the source node S receives two independent
certificate chains as shown in the example in Figures 8, and 9 for the route request and
the route reply processes respectively. The first certificate chain contains certificates
of nodes, B, E, and Q in addition to the destination node’s certificate. The second
certificate chain contains certificates of nodes, C, F , and K in addition to the destination
node’s certificate. According to the computed trust values for each certificate chain, the
source node S chooses a chain to be used in transmitting data packets to the destination
node D. After receiving the second route reply the route request table of the source
node S will be as shown in table 4.
3. Public-Key Certificate Verification
The verification of the public-key certificate is performed by checking the validity
time Tv in the certificates forming the certificate chain. After verifying the certificates
of the certificate chain the authenticity of the public keys of both the source and the
destination nodes is performed by the certificate chain from the source node to the
destination node and vice versa.
4. Public-Key Certificate Revocation
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Each node can revoke a certificate it issued if it believes that the binding between the
public key and the node’s identity is no longer valid or the trust value of the target
node is below the trust threshold. Each node can revoke its own certificate if it believes
that its private key is compromised. A node can revoke its own certificate by broad-
casting a certificate revocation message signed by its private key to nodes it directly
trusts includes the revoked certificate and the new one. When a node receives the cer-
tificate revocation message, it verifies the revocation message and replaces the revoked
certificate by the new one. A node can revoke a certificate it issued by broadcasting
a certificate revocation message signed by its private key to nodes it directly trusts.
When a node receives a certificate revocation message, it verifies the signature of the
revocation message, searches in its trust table for the trust values of the sending node
and that of the node its certificate is claimed to be revoked. According to the search
results, it will do the following:
• If the search results yields that the trust value of the sending node is greater than
the trust threshold (i.e. the sending node is trustworthy), it multiplies the trust
value of the sending node by -1.
• Adds the calculated value from the previous step to the trust value of the node its
certificate is claimed to be revoked.
• If the sum from the previous step is below the trust threshold, it deletes the
revoked certificate from its trust table. Otherwise if the sum is still greater than
the trust threshold, the accused certificate is still to be used.
• Otherwise, if the search results yields that the trust value of the sending node is
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below the trust threshold (i.e. the sending node is not trustworthy), it ignores the
revocation message.
3.3 Communication Cost
The communication cost of our proposed scheme consists of two phases; the route re-
quest phase and the route reply phase. In the route request phase, the source node sends
the route request packet to nodes it directly trusts without inserting its own certificate in
the route request packet as this certificate is stored in the trust table of nodes it directly
trusts which saves bandwidth in the first hop. The communication cost of the certificate
chain discovery during the route request phase can be calculated as follows:
Creq(h) =
i=h
∑
i=2
di× (i−1)× cert_size
Where h is the average number of hops between the source and the destination, d is
the average number of trusted nodes per node, and cert_size is the size of the certificate.
In the route reply phase, the destination node does not insert its own certificate in
the first hop because this certificate is stored in the trust table on nodes it directly trusts
which saves bandwidth in the first hop of the route reply. The destination node sends a
route reply message to all sender nodes it has received the route request from according
to its trust reply table as shown in table 3.
The upper limit of the communication cost in this phase can be calculated as fol-
lows:
Crep(h) =
i=h
∑
i=2
(i−1)×d× cert_size
The total communication cost of the certificate chain discovery process will be
calculated as follows:
Ctotal(h) = Creq(h)+Crep(h)
Ctotal(h) =
i=h
∑
i=2
d× (1+di−1)× (i−1)× cer_size
4 Simulation Environment and Performance Metrics
4.1 Simulation Environment
Simulations were performed using Network Simulator (NS-2) [18], particularly pop-
ular in the ad hoc networking community. on a desktop with an Intel cor 2 Duo 2.6
GHz processor and 1 GB memory. The OpenSSL library (version 0.9.8h) [19] is used
for generating certificates, and digital signatures [20]. In order to complete a certificate
chain with probability equal to 0.999, the average number of trusted nodes per node
need not to be less than 6 as discussed in subsection 3.2. The MAC layer protocol
14
IEEE 802.11 is used in all simulations. The source-destination pairs are spread ran-
domly over the network. The ns-2 constant bit-rate (CBR) traffic generator is used to
set up the connection patterns with different random seeds. Each node has one CBR
traffic connection with a single unique destination and can generate at most 10,000
packets. Sources initiation time is uniformly distributed over the first 90 seconds of
the simulation time. Every simulation run is 1000 seconds long. The mobgenss [21]
mobility scenario generator was used to produce random waypoint mobility patterns
[22]. The random waypoint mobility model is widely used model when evaluating
MANETs [23, 24, 25, 26] and hence is considered in this paper. The pause time is set
to zero. The Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [17] was
chosen for the simulations. The simulation results are the average of 10 runs. The
rest of the simulation parameters are summarized in table 5. These scenarios are the
worst case scenarios because all nodes in the network are transmitting and receiving
packets starting from the time of joining the network till the end of the simulation. It
is generally accepted that data encrypted using a key size of 2048-bits should be safe.
Therefore, the public key would require 256 bytes, a signature consists of 128 bytes
value, node’s identity is of 16 bytes, network address is of 16 byte, sequence number is
of 16 bytes, trust value is of 16 bytes, and the certificate expiration time can be encoded
in 2 bytes. In the simulation, a certificate < IDA ; Network Add; PK; Sequence #; Ex-
piration time; trust value; signature; 62 bytes reserved> will be a total of 512 bytes in
length.
4.2 Performance Metrics
We have selected the packet delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay, the number of
certificates delivered through the network, certificate chain completion ratio, average
hop length, and the routing overhead as metrics during the simulation in order to eval-
uate the performance of the proposed robust self-organized public key management for
mobile ad hoc networks.
Packet delivery ratio (PDR): The ratio of data packets delivered to destinations to those
generated by sources.
Average end-to-end delay: This includes all possible delays caused by buffering dur-
ing route discovery latency, queuing at the interface queue, retransmission delays at the
MAC, and propagation and transfer times.
Number of certificates delivered through the network: the total number of certificates
delivered through the network during the certificate chain discovery processes.
Certificate chain completion ratio: is the ratio of the average number of independent
certificate chains received by a node to the number of transmitted route requests.
Routing Overhead: The ratio of the total number of routing packets to data packets
transmitted during the simulation.
5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the simulation results will be presented. The performance evaluation of
the proposed scheme will be performed in two steps, in the first step, a comparison of
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the performance of the proposed scheme, the performance of Ren et al. web of trust
scheme [13], and the CBR reference which is the simulation of the AODV [17] without
any modifications are presented. The performances of the three mentioned schemes
are measured for different numbers of trusted nodes per node. In the second step the
dynamical characteristic of the proposed scheme will be presented by measuring the
performance of the proposed scheme in a realistic environment for different numbers
of nodes joining and leaving the network.
5.1 Performance of the Proposed Scheme
Figure 10: Packet Delivery Ratio PDR % vs Number of trusted nodes / node
Figure 10 shows that the packet delivery ratio increases with increasing the number
of trusted nodes per node d. In our proposed scheme, discovering a certificate chain
is performed through trusted nodes only. However, increasing the number of trusted
neighbors d increases the probability for a node to discover a certificate chain which
results in an increase in the packet delivery ratio. Increasing the number of trusted
nodes per node d to 6 at the network initialization phase (as expected in our setting)
makes the packet delivery ratio approaches that of the AODV reference. It shows also
that Ren et al. scheme is not robust in the mobility environment as increasing the node’s
speed from 0.1 m/ sec to 5 m/sec and 20 m/ sec degrades the packet delivery ratio too
much.
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Figure 11: End-to-end Delay in sec vs Number of trusted nodes / node
Figure 12: Number of certificates delivered through the network
Figure 11 shows that the end-to-end delay of our proposed scheme for d equal to
6 approaches the end-to-end delay of AODV reference, and the end-to-end delay of
Ren et al. is far away from the end-to-end delay of AODV reference because of the
successive failures to find certificate chains. Figure 11 shows also that the end-to-end
delay in our proposed scheme increases with increasing the number of trusted nodes
per node d. In order to understand why the end-to-end delay increases with increasing
d we should put Figure 13 into context which shows the average hop length (AHL) as a
function of the number of trusted nodes per node. It is obvious that the AHL increases
with increasing d. By increasing d, data and control packets traverse higher number
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Figure 13: Average Hop Length
of hops than that in case of lower d which result in higher end-to-end-delay. Figure
12 shows that the number of delivered certificates through the network increases as d
increases as expected. It also shows that the number of delivered certificates of Ren et
al. scheme is lower than that of our proposed scheme.
Figure 13 shows the certificate chain completion probability as a function of the
number of trusted nodes per node. Increasing the value of d increases the certificate
chain completion probability. For d equal to 8, nodes can certainly complete a certifi-
cate chain. Completing a certificate chain in Ren et al. scheme for 0.1 m/ sec node
mobility does not exceed 0.68 and becomes worse with increasing nodes mobility. It
is obvious from Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 that when d is less than three it is very
difficult for a node to get two independent certificate chains as a reply to its request
which causes a degradation on the network performance.
5.2 The Dynamic Characteristics of the Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated with regard
to different numbers of nodes joining and leaving the network which is known as the
dynamical characteristics of the network. Nodes joining and leaving the network have
been simulated in ns-2 [18] by changing the initial energy of the Mobile node in its
energy model.
The processes of joining and leaving the network occur simultaneously while keep-
ing the network size unchanged. The performance of the network is measured after
each pair of nodes leaves or joins the network. In order to simulate a realistic network,
the simulation environment used in subsection 4.1 will be the same except that the
number of connections is set to 25 rather than 50.
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Figure 14: Packet Delivery Ratio PDR % vs Number of Nodes Leaving and Joining
Figure 15: End-to-end Delay in sec vs Number of Nodes Leaving and Joining
Figure 14 shows that the packet delivery ratio of our proposed scheme has changed
little even after the number of nodes leaving and joining the network approaches 10, i.e.
20 % of the network size. The packet delivery ratio in this scenario is higher than the
packet delivery ratio in Figure 10 due to decreasing the number of connections to 25
rather than 50. Decreasing the number of connections result in an increase in the packet
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delivery ratio as a result of decreasing the radio interference and collisions between
nodes caused by the hidden/exposed terminals problems. The change in the end-to-end
delay of our proposed scheme with increasing the number of nodes leaving and joining
the network was low even for 20 % of nodes leaving and joining the network as shown
in figure 15.
Figure 16: Number of certificates delivered through the network vs Number of Nodes
Leaving and Joining
The number of certificates delivered through the network decreases with increasing
the number of nodes leaving and joining the network as shown in figure 16.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we study the security of the proposed key management scheme. In
the network initialization phase, an attacker can compromise a mobile node and try to
deceive other nodes by making them believe in false certificates. First, the malicious
node can insert false certificates in the certificate chain during the certificate chain dis-
covery process. This can be done by binding a public key PKA to a user B instead of
to a user A. It can also be done by binding a false key PK
′
A to a user A. Second the
malicious node can delete certificates from the certificate chain to thwart the certificate
chain discovery process. Our proposed key management scheme prevents these attacks
by allowing mobile nodes to detect false certificates and to perform the public key au-
thentication process with high probability. If a malicious node inserted false certificates
in the certificate chain, or deleted correct certificates from the certificate chain during
the certificate chain discovery process, the authentication process will not be affected
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Figure 17: Certificate Chain Completion Ratio
because the source node waits until it receives two independent certificate chains with-
out any intersecting node to perform the authentication process. If a certificate received
by a mobile node that binds a node ID A to a public key PKA and later on received a cer-
tificate that binds the node ID A to a public key PK
′
A, it can easily detect the duplication.
The duplication can be resolved by authenticating the (ID, PKA) pair through another
two independent certificate chains. The existence of the trust value along with the cer-
tificate enhances the security of our proposed key management scheme by enabling
mobile nodes to choose the certificate chain that has the highest trust value. Figures 17
and 18 justified the robustness of the proposed key management scheme against mali-
cious nodes attacks. In Figure 17, the certificate chain completion ratio is calculated
for different number of malicious nodes in the network. It shows that the certificate
chain completion ratio increases with increasing node’s mobility due to decreasing the
average hop length with increasing the node’s mobility as shown in Figure 13, i.e. the
number of certificates in the certificate chain is lower during higher mobility than that
in lower mobility which makes the certificate chain discovery process easier. Figure
17 shows also that the certificate chain completion ratio decreases with increasing the
number of malicious nodes in the network as a result of inserting false certificates or
deleting correct ones. It is obvious from Figure 17 that mobile nodes can perform the
certificate chain discovery process and subsequently the public key authentication with
high probability even the number of malicious nodes in a 50-nodes network reaches 10,
i.e. the number of malicious nodes is 20 % of the network size. Figure 18 shows that
the induced routing overhead due to increasing the number of malicious nodes in the
network which results in increasing failures in the certificate chain discovery process
and an increase in broadcasting certificate revocation messages through the network is
negligible for different node’s mobility.
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Figure 18: Routing Overhead
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a robust self-organized public key management scheme.
The proposed scheme exploits the routing infrastructure to discover a certificate chain
through a web of trust. A measure of the communication cost of the certificate chain
discovery process has been proposed. The first contribution of this paper is that our
proposed scheme has low communication cost because each node limits its search for
the certificate chain to its directly trusted nodes only. The second contribution is that
the use of trust values along with the public key certificates in at least two indepen-
dent certificate chains enhances the authentication of the proposed key management
scheme. The third contribution is concluded from the performance evaluation of Ren
et al. scheme that shows that random graph theory is not suitable for managing trust in
the mobility environment of MANET. Random graph theory is suitable for trust man-
agement during the network initialization phase or for stationary networks only. The
results have shown that our proposed scheme has negligible impact on the network per-
formance and the scheme is suitable for stationary networks and networks with low to
high mobility. Simulation results show also that our proposed scheme is robust in both
the dynamic and the static networks and against malicious nodes attacks.
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Table 1: Trust Table
Node ID Certificate Trust Value
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Table 2: Route Request Table
RREQ ID Destination
ID
1st Hop
Node ID
2nd Hop
Node ID …
Last Hop
Node ID
Trust
Value Chain #
1st
 Chain
2nd
chain
...
Table 3: Trust Reply Table
Source
 ID
Destination
ID
RREQ
ID
Sender 1 Sender 2 ... Sender n
Node ID Node ID Node ID Node ID
Table 4: Route Request Table Of the Source Node S
RREQ ID Destination
ID
1st Hop
Node ID
2nd Hop
Node ID
Last Hop
Node ID
Trust
Value Chain #
1st
 Chain
2nd
chain
1 D
D
B E Q
C F K
Value 1
Value 21
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Table 5: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
No. of Nodes 50
Area (m2) 1000x1000
Transmission range 250m
Mobility Model Random waypoint
Propagation Model TwoRayGround
Mean speeds (m/s) 0, 5, 20
Data Rate 11 Mbps
Load 4 packet/s
CBR connections 50
Data packet size 512 bytes
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